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Reliability on the Crowded Net
Finding the Truth in a Web of Deceit
P.D. Magnus
pmagnus@fecundity.com
"Information isn't knowledge."
—an ad for Fortune magazine
Abstract
On the Internet, everyone is encouraged to have and express an opinion: On the
evening news, an anchor encourages me to visit the station's web site and share my
opinion about the day's news. At the same time, the Internet has become a first line of
research: If I wonder what the capital of Mongolia is, for instance, I am as likely to search
the web as I am to search my shelves for an appropriate book. The desire to find facts
on the Internet is potentially in conflict with the proliferation of information: If everyone on
the net were to take their best guess as to the capital of Mongolia, I would be ill-advised
to trust some random selection from the responses.
On-line, just as off-line, there are ways of assessing the credibility of information
sources. The Internet, although it arguably makes for nothing wholly new in this regard,
complicates the ordinary task of assessing credibility.
In the first section, I consider a specific example and argue that Internet content
providers have no clear interest in resolving this tension. In the second, I consider four
general ways that we might assess credibility and explore how they apply to life on-line.
Finally, I argue that even careful information gathering may pose subtle pitfalls but that
some of these may be mitigated on-line.
1. The Tension Between
Expression and Reliability
To take one example, Amazon.com
encourages visitors to post reviews of
the products that are available for
purchase from the site and even
encourages visitors to vote whether
reviews written by other visitors were
helpful or not. If Amazon were
interested in furthering the cause of
knowledge, perhaps it might be relied
upon to disarm the potential conflict
between inclusiveness and reliability.
Since Amazon is interested primarily in
selling books (plus toys, stereos, and so
on), it can only be expected to promote
reliability if that in turn promotes its
bottom line. Does it? It could be argued
that accurate reviews make for happy
customers, happy customers will return
to buy more, and thus Amazon does
have an interest in discouraging false or
inaccurate information. This supposes
that the reviews at Amazon's site are
primarily a service to customers, and
this is not obviously the case.
Encouraging visitors to write product
reviews encourages them to associate
themselves with Amazon's site and thus
promotes customer loyalty. There is
another, perhaps less obvious, reason.
Consider that Amazon, like any
business, has an interest in collecting
information about its customers. By
using cookies, Amazon can track where
on the site a visitor goes, but the
information that can be gathered with
cookies is incomplete for a host of
reasons. Users may visit the site from
more than one computer, multiple users
may share single computers, and
visitors may refuse to accept cookies.
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In order to enter a review,  visitors must
identify themselves by entering their
Amazon user name and password. A
visitor must do this even if only to rate a
review as helpful or not helpful. There
are rationales for this requirement; for
instance, it assures that a user does not
vote a dozen times for the helpfulness of
his own review. Yet it also allows
Amazon to associate users with
particular product preferences, offering
many advantages over cookies alone.
Users voluntarily supply information
that identifies them uniquely. Where a
cookie may allow Amazon to determine
that a particular user looked at the
product description for a digital camera
and a stereo system, if that user rated
several reviews for the camera but none
for the stereo then Amazon may infer
that the user was more seriously
interested in the former than the latter.
Information gathered from reviews may
be combined with cookies, of course, to
provide more marketing information
than either method alone. Thus,
Amazon can gather considerable
marketing information about its visitors
from the system of reviews, regardless
of whether the reviews spread accurate
or inaccurate information. The point is
not that Amazon will make insidious
use of this information or that it
represents an invasion of visitors'
privacy; perhaps they will and perhaps
it does, but perhaps not. The point is
that the marketing value of the system
of reviews is a sufficient reason for
Amazon to encourage it.
Given that allowing reviews costs
Amazon very little, that policing them
for accuracy would increase the cost
considerably, and that it promotes
Amazon's interests to have the reviews
regardless of their accuracy, one can
hardly expect Amazon to assure that the
information provided in reviews is
accurate. One may easily shrug off this
analysis, since it concerns reviews.
Reviews, one might think, are matters of
opinion. Whether or not Joe in
Tuscaloosa enjoyed the latest Tom
Clancy novel is not the sort of fact
anyone searches the Internet to discover.
Moreover, if the review addresses only
issues that are matters of taste, then it is
not clear that Joe can be wrong. He may
say things with which I would disagree,
but this would only be because our
tastes differ. On the Internet, just as off-
line, there is no disputing matters of
taste.
The reply here is threefold. First,
reviews are not always mere statements
of taste. In a  review of the movie The
Seven Samurai, "A viewer from Akron,
OH" states:
Lest anyone be dissuaded from
purchasing this masterpiece
because they believe it is not
presented in its original aspect
ratio, it should be known that
THE 1.33:1 ASPECT RATIO ON THIS
DVD IS CORRECT. Akira Kurosawa
did not begin working with the
widescreen format until later in
the 1950s. Anyone who asserts
otherwise is mistaken.
The review  makes a factual claim, the
truth of which is critical to its value as a
review. Moreover, it contains
encouragement to ignore any competing
factual claims.
Second, claims which we read but had
not sought out are sometimes the most
insidious. Take the example above.
Sometime after reading the review, I
found myself in a conversation in which
I offered the claim as if it were a fact.
Because I was not concerned with the
aspect ratio of the film at the time I read
the review, I did not critically evaluate
the source. At a later time, when I was
concerned to know the aspect ratio, I
only remembered that it was not
widescreen. In this case I am able to
reconstruct where I had acquired that
belief— although I suspect I may have
read it somewhere else as well— but it
is probably the exception. Claims which
are trivial to us when we read them may
easily lay claim to our belief, but we
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often continue to believe them even
when they become of some
consequence.
Third and perhaps most importantly,
the phenomenon is not confined to
reviews. Sites like Slashdot.org,
Kuro5hin.org, and Im-Ur.com offer
stories meant as items of news, but
written or submitted by members. These
sites rely on members for submissions
and on those submissions being
interesting to visitors, but they do not
obviously rely on the truth or reliability
of the news items they carry. Further,
the low-cost of hosting allows any
crackpot to post his delusions to the
web— and low-cost hosting services
encourage him to do just that.
The tension between free expression
and reliability is inevitable in a free
society, and we have ways of dealing
with it off-line. Even if life on-line poses
no fundamentally new problems in this
regard, it exacerbates problems and
disables old coping mechanisms. In the
next section, I consider several methods
for assessing credibility on-line.
2. Four Methods of Assessing
Credibility
The previous section was aimed to show
that the quantity of content on the
Internet results in a decreased reliability
for arbitrary selections from that
content. We are thus confronted with
the problem of determining which
claims should be believed. The most
obvious way of determining this is to
look for reliable sources. This shifts the
problem from deciding which claims are
to be believed to deciding which sources
are to be trusted.
Appeal to Reliability
We may appeal to our background
beliefs to decide whether someone will
reliably make accurate claims. As an
example, suppose someone— let's call
him E— goes to a fan site that describes
what happened at a recent concert.
Suppose that the fan site is maintained
by H, who claims to have been at the
concert herself. If E believes that she
was at the concert and that she is being
honest, he is justified in believing that
things happened as she describes. His
ability to trust a particular claim (that
such and so happened at the concert)
relies on his accepting an indefinite list
of other, background claims (that H
went to the concert, that H is not
spreading malicious rumors about the
band, and so on). Call this the method of
appeal to reliability.  The problem with it
is readily apparent: how can E be sure of
his background beliefs?
Off-line, he has ways to address this
question. H may be a friend of E or at
least a friend of a friend; someone
besides H herself will swear for her.
Perhaps H can show her ticket stub to E
or provide other physical evidence.
Such checks allow him to judge whether
she went to the concert and so on; he
can make these checks against a source
besides her own testimony.
In an on-line community, chat room, or
IRC channel, E may be able to rely on
similar resources. E may trust some
members of the group who would
swear for H. This is only possible,
though, if E has been involved in the
community long enough to trust some
members of it and if H has been
involved long enough that those others
will swear for her. If E only knows H
from her web site, it may be that all he
knows about her is what she has had to
say for herself.
Although illustrated in terms of
individual people, these issues arise
with institutional sources as well.
Consider, for example, that Billy Barty
died last December. Suppose E believes
this because he read it in the New York
Times and because he believes that the
Times is typically accurate about this
sort of thing. It makes little difference
whether he read it in the actual paper or
on the Times web site.
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Some news sites—  like nytimes.com—
are extensions of traditional
publications, and we would trust them
to whatever degree we would trust their
traditional counterpart. In the
proliferation of news web sites,
however, many  do not have an off-line
sponsor from which to derive
credibility. Evaluating the reliability of
such sources can only be guided by their
on-line presence, but the very question
is whether their on-line claims are
reliable. This circularity makes appeals
to reliability ultimately unsatisfactory.
Appeal to Plausibility
If we are unable to determine which
particular sources are to be trusted,
there are still ways that we can cull
through content. We might assess the
plausibility of a particular claim,
independently of whomever the source
might have been. In addition to judging
content, we might judge the plausibility
of the form in which a claim is
presented. To illustrate the former: If E
reads on a web site that Princess Diana's
death was arranged by a conspiracy of
Arab oil men, then he may reject it on
grounds of plausibility. To illustrate the
latter: Suppose E does a search for high-
energy physics research and finds the
web page of someone, call her P, who
claims to have a PhD in physics and
who describes several cutting-edge
projects. How should E evaluate what P
has to say? If P does not write using the
language of a professional physicist, E
may doubt whether P had really
completed a PhD. If P writes in the style
of a high school student, E should
probably not give the site much
credence. Note that E can make these
judgements regardless of what
particular claims P is making. Call this
method, whether applied to content or
to form, appeal to plausibility.
Unfortunately, it only yields negative
results. We should be disinclined to
believe things that are implausible, but
the fact that something is plausible does
not by itself show that we should
believe it.
Calibration
E still has other ways to assess the
content of P's web page. He can
compare the partial knowledge he has
of high-energy physics with the claims
made on the web page. If the page is
correct on those points, then the page
might be expected to be correct on other
points as well. Call this the method of
calibration: E can judge the page reliable
if, on the things he can check, it gets
things right.
The problems with calibration turn on
which facts E is able to check. Suppose
P's website contains some claims taken
from a standard physics textbook and
others from P's fevered imagination. If E
reads the standard textbook to check the
claims made by P, then he will find that
every claim he can check is correct. If he
supposes on the basis of this that P's site
is generally trustworthy, he will accept
P's delusional ravings. If E's base of
knowledge is not systematically related
to P's, though, the method of calibration
should give E a good measure of how
much to rely on P's web page.
Both appeal to plausibility and
calibration require that we have some
non-trivial knowledge about the subject
matter that interests us before we can
evaluate on-line sources on the topic.
This difficulty is magnified because we
often go on-line to look for information
about something just because we know
little about it ourselves.
Sampling
These methods consider a particular
report or web page in isolation, but it is
further possible to assess the reliability
of a claim by comparing related claims
made by several sources. If all sources
disagree, then the choice of which if any
to trust must be made on the basis of
some other method. If all or most agree,
then those attract more credibility than
they would if they were considered
separately. This method,  which we may
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call sampling, will correct for individual
bias and error but will fail to increase
reliability if distorting biases are shared
by all or most of the sample.
A mundane example of sampling is the
practice of asking for a second opinion.
If E is diagnosed with a serious illness
and his doctor recommends surgery, he
may insist on asking another doctor. If
the diagnosis was the result of some
mistake or if his doctor was unusually
keen on surgery, then the second doctor
will hopefully offer a different opinion.
If the test used to detect the disease
systematically returns false positives or
if both doctors rely on the same protocol
to decide if E's problem requires
surgery, then the second opinion will
accord with the first and lead E to place
potentially unwarranted trust in the
diagnosis and recommendation.
Sampling has similar strengths and
weaknesses when used to evaluate
claims found on-line. If a website
contains errors that result from authors
being careless, confused, or
idiosyncratically deluded, other pages
are unlikely to contain those same
errors; so, a comparison of multiple
pages can separate those errors from
other claims. Conversely, where many
authors have copied information from a
common source or from each other,
sampling will not increase reliability.
Even if authors do not share sources,
sampling will fail to help if they share
some distorting bias. Sampling applied
to claims made on the Internet
automatically excludes people who do
not use the Internet, and for some topics
this may introduce a significant bias.
Combinations
The four strategies discussed here
exhaust the ways in which a claim
found on the Internet can be reasonably
evaluated. They may, of course, be used
in conjunction with one another.
Sources that calibrate positively may
count for more in sampling; claims
made by one reliable source may be
used as a basis against which to
calibrate another source; and so on. In
cases where the methods are insufficient
to justify much confidence, we are
forced either to look to more traditional
sources or to do without knowing what
we had gone on-line to learn.
Permutations
The four methods considered above
address the question of whether or not a
claim found on-line is to be believed,
but variants of them may be used to
infer what to believe from what can be
found on-line. Consider a discussion
earlier this year on ArsTechnica.com
which degenerated into a flame war
between people who insisted that AMD
chips are great and others who insisted
that AMD chips are junk. One might
conclude that AMD chips outperform
but are less reliable than Intel chips.
This conclusion isn't stated explicitly by
either party in the heated exchange, but
may be inferred from the fact that many
of respondents report high performance
from the chips along with the fact that
many respondents report that the chips
can not be made to work. This is
something like sampling, but the
conclusion of it is not to trust either
party of flamers.
3. Pitfalls of Information Gathering
The four methods make it possible to
assess the credibility of a claim found
on-line, but problems remain even if we
are vigilant; a claim may be misleading
even if it is true. If some contributor to a
discussion board complains about a
particular product, then people who
read that post may well be left with a
poor impression of the product and its
manufacturer. Yet the complaint— even
if true— represents the experience of
only one of thousands of customers.
Ideally, a sample of different posts
about that product will give a fair
distribution of responses. However, it
will often be the case that unsatisfied
customers are more likely to write about
their experiences than satisfied
customers, while for some products it
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may be that zealous advocates for the
product are most vocal. In either
situation, judging the reliability of this
or that claim is not enough. It is also
essential to determine how the
contributors' experiences with the
product reflect on the product generally.
In addition to uncertainty about the
veracity of claims, then, there can be
uncertainty about the significance of
them. This may occur with traditional
media too, of course. Increasingly
prominent coverage of crime in a
newspaper or on television— even
where factually accurate— can foster the
inaccurate perception that crime is on
the rise. There is some hope that this
sort of misrepresentation is actually less
on the Internet than in traditional
media. Slate.com, which summarizes
and condenses news from around the
world, indicates where different
newspapers print stories. It thus
reinforces the lesson that there is
disagreement about the lead story on
any given day. It is easy enough to
download the front pages of several
major newspapers and make this sort of
survey yourself. Moreover, the low cost
of putting together a webpage allows
views to be represented which would
not be represented prominently— and
perhaps not at all— in traditional media.
This is just the feature of the Internet
that causes problems for reliability. This
should come as no surprise: For any
claim, free expression increases the
likelihood that someone will make it.
This holds for true claims as well as
false ones.
Conclusion
Cybernetics began as the study of
information systems, so it should be no
surprise that cyberspace opens new
possibilities for gathering information
and presents new challenges to
gathering reliable information. There are
ways to meet the challenge, and they are
the same ways we have for gathering
reliable information out in meatspace. In
a sense, then, this paper has merely
rehearsed things we already knew.
There is some value in making them
explicit, however, and more in holding
them up to reflection.
